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Money market prices have an important role in the transmission of mo-
netary policy. The prices are influenced not only by the monetary policy
decisions but also by the beliefs of market makers. According to the Czech
National Bank (CNB or Bank), the surveyed inflation expectations do not
influence policy decisions. They are only collected for informative pur-
poses. The Bank’s own inflation forecasts dominate the private forecast
in policy decision making. It is believed that the Bank has more and bet-
ter information about the economy and its future prospects than private
agents. In the adaptive learning theory – see e.g. (Evans – Honkapohja,
2003) – which is likely to apply to the Czech economy, if the expectations
of thecentral bank and private agents differ, and, at thesame time, thepri-
vate agents’ expectations form market prices, it might be desirable for
the central bank, in order to meet its objectives of inflation and output
gap variability minimization, to set its instruments given the private ex-
pectations.
The Czech National Bank runs monthly surveys on the inflation expec-
tations of representative institutions operating on the Czech financial mar-
ket. In this paper we analyze, from the macroeconomic perspective (which
will be explained later), the relevance of these expectations for the mone-
tary policy, i.e. their role in the formation of prices in the Czech Interbank
money market. The question we ask is: To what extent do the surveyed ex-
pectations correspond to the true market expectations? Or put differently, do
the surveyed expectations include any monetary-policy relevant informa-
tion?
This paper builds on the following four observations which all together
provide grounds for assessing the relevance of private forecasts for the mo-
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netary policy. When interpreting the results in this paper, one should bear
in mind that:
1. the CNB sets its policy instrument given its own inflation forecasts (see
CNB’s Inflation Reports);
2. the CNB’s inflation forecasts are conducted on a lower frequency (quar-
terly) than the financial-analysts-inflation-forecast surveys which are
formed on a monthly basis;
3. the CNB’s discount rate (policy instrument) influences the mean values
of market interest rates (in this paper we focus on 1Y PRIBOR) (Fi-
gure 1). The policy instrument adjusts on a lower frequency than money
market prices;
4. the money-market price influences themean value of credit-market prices
(Figure 2).
FIGURE 1 PRIBOR 1Y and Discount Rate
FIGURE 2 The Interbank Money-market Price, and Credit and Deposit Market Prices
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in Figure 3 reveals that the expectations exhibit a tendency for overshoot-
ing and inefficiency. What is remarkable, however, Figure 4 shows very si-
milar behavior of the money-market price (PRIBOR – Prague Interbank Of-
fer Rate) and of the surveyed expectations. A very similar development of
PRIBOR and private forecasts is significant till March 2004. Then a struc-
tural break occurred. After an upward correction for the impact of the tax
reform and of the expected growth in world oil prices due to the second war
in Iraq, it seems the nominal interest rate and expectations follow a simi-
lar trajectory again, although on a different level. The ex ante and also ex
post real return on the Interbank market are negative now.
Given these observations, our interest is to analyze whether the surveyed
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FIGURE 3 Comparison of Inflation Expectations and Actual Inflation
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pectations have any impact on the market data. We may observe an inte-
resting paradox. In Figure 3, the expectations do not have any predictive
power for the actual inflation rate.1 However, in Figure 4, it seems the ex-
pectations are reflected in the money market price. It is true that the money
market interest rate is, in general, given by a monetary policy rule (see
the observation 1 and 3 above). Having its own forecasts, the central bank
sets the magnitude of its instruments. This is done however on a low (quar-
terly) frequency. Looking at Figure 4, the variability of private forecasts is
projected in the variance of the interest rate. If the Interbank interest rate
transmits in the credit market rates (see observation 4), one should suspect
that the private expectations has economic relevance even though they do
not have a predictive power for actual inflation. The paper tests this in a for-
mal way.
Forming expectations is an essential part of any optimal decision mak-
ing of any individual. Macroeconomic theory builds on the rational ex-
pectation hypothesis (REH). Certainly, because agents are heterogenous
(they face different information utilization costs, they have different in-
formation sets available, etc.), expectations about the future differ. For
the REH it is important that the expectations are on average (of all indi-
viduals) unbiased and efficient, i.e., on the aggregate level the expecta-
tions correspond to reality with only minor and random differences.
Recently Mankiw and Wolfers (2003) provided empirical evidence 
(for the American economy) that inflation expectations differ for different
groups of agents (households, firms, academics, professional forecasters,
etc.), which they explain by a sticky information model. According to their
model, the disagreement in expectations varies with the state of the econo-
my. However, over all economy states financial analysts form the most ef-
ficient and consistent inflation forecasts from all the groups Mankiw and
Wolfers study. It is because the financial analysts have the best market-re-
lated information. If we assume that this applies to the Czech conditions
as well, it calls into question why the forecasts in Figure 3 are inefficient
and inconsistent and why they still have predictive power on the price on
the Interbank market.
In this paper we only deal with the expectations of a single group of peo-
ple, financial analysts. As such, one would think that what we observe in
Figure 3 is irrelevant for judging the applicability of the assumptions of
theREH which require we survey arepresentative sample over alleconomic
agents (households, firms, financial intermediators, etc.). This paper is
based on thefact that theInterbank money market is dominant in theCzech
financial system, unlike the US market. The CNB surveys a representative
sample of financial analysts who represent the major market-makers on
the Czech Interbank market. The price the market-makers create (PRI-
BOR) strongly influences other financial market prices (credit, swap mar-
ket prices, etc.). Thus, if the financial analysts’ expectations play a role in
the determination of PRIBOR, then judging their properties and the us-
ability for macroeconomic analysis is appropriate.
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1 They rather seem to be consistent with the CNB’s inflation target.
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ket from the macroeconomic (modeling) perspective, and that it will be ab-
stracted from the real mechanism of how the market functions, i.e., how
the market price is actually formed. The Fisher rule is the result of any
macroeconomic model based on the first principles. Under certain assump-
tions, the Fisher rule can also be view as an optimal monetary policy rule
– see e.g. (Woodford, 2003, Ch. 2). As such it will be a cornerstone of our
testing metodology, similar to Fama and Gibbons (1982), Mishkin (1990a)
or Mishkin (1990b).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The methodology is for-
mulated in the next section 2. The data set and estimation results with their
interpretation follow in sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 concludes
with a discussion of the results.
2. The Methodology
The methodology developed in this section is structured so that the stated
question of interest “To what extent do the surveyed expectations correspond
to the true market expectations?” is addressed. To this purpose the null hy-
pothesis is formulated as: “The market expectations coincide with the sur-
veyed expectations.”
It ought to be pointed out that in the methodology developed below the ex-
pectations’ rationality, as assumed by the REH, is not questioned. Instead,
the assumption is weakened and the expectations may be biased and ineffi-
cient.
Testing H0, similar to Fama and Gibbons (1982), Mishkin (1990a) and
Mishkin (1990b), the Fisher rule is assumed as the true pricing rule for
the money market, i.e.,
it
m =  
e
t,m +r t
m +  t (1)
where it
m is the nominal interest rate valid from the beginning of period t
to t+m , 
e
t,m are the true market expectations formed at the beginning of
period t for the t+mtime horizon, and rt
m is the corresponding ex ante real
interest rate. The Fisher rule further includes the risk premium  t, which
is assumed to follow a stationary process uncorrelated with expected infla-
tion and the real interest rate.
In a standard way, let us assume that the inflation expectations are based
on information   available at time t. Furthermore, following assumptions
common to the literature, let us assume that the market inflation expecta-
tions at time t for the t+mhorizon are equal to the actual inflation rate
 t+m, but are subject to a random error  t+m. Formally written,
 
e
t,m =E ( t+m     t) =  t+m+  t+m (2)
Under the REH, it holds that  t+mis iid with zero mean and finite vari-
ance. If the mean is non-zero, then the expectations are biased. If the ex-
pectation error follows a stationary process with zero mean, the expecta-
tions are so-called weakly rational. For the testing procedure developed
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they can be both rational or weakly rational, i.e.  t+mcan be iid or have
anAR structure, respectively. Recalling the non-zero auto-covariance struc-
ture causes only inefficiency of expectations but does not affect their con-
sistency.
As the objective is to find the relation of the surveyed expectations to
the market ones, it is convenient and sufficient to keep  t+min a nearly un-
specified form.
Now substituting (2) in (1) yields
it
m =  t+m+  t+m+r t
m +  t (3)
Depending on the correlation of expected inflation, ( t+m+  t+m ), and ex
ante real interest rate, rt
m, as argued in (Mishkin, 1990b), the relation be-
tween nominal interest rate and expected inflation does not need to be one-
-to-one. Hence, we augment (3) into a more general form
it
m =  1 ( t+m+  t+m) + rt
m +  t (3a)
The Fisher rule where  1 =1   counts only for a special case. 
Now adding and subtracting the mean values of the real interest rate,
unanticipated inflation and risk premium ( 1E ( t+m), E(rt), E( t)), (3a) be-
comes
it =  0 +  1  t+m+  t (4)
where
 0 =  1E( t+m) + E(rt) + E( t)
and
 t =  1 t+m+ rt+  t – [ 1E( t+m) + E(rt) + E( t)] =
=  1 ( 
e
t,m –  t+m) + rt+  t –  0
The constant term  0 will be in general different from zero. As discussed
above, no specific assumptions are imposed on  t+m , and thus in general
E( t+m) may be non-zero. Similar can be said about the mean values of theex
ante real interest rate, E(rt), and the risk premium, E( t), which both can
be expected to be of positive magnitudes.
For  t in formulation (4), one is not able to separate the real interest rate
and risk premium from the expectation error. It is impossible to distinguish
what part of the variation of  t accounts for the unanticipated inflation and
what part accounts for the ex ante real interest rate and risk premium vari-
ability. One is not able to extract the error in the market expectations from
 t, and to learn the expectations’ exact form.2 The testing procedure avoids
this limitation. The empirical test is built solely on the comparison of ex-
pectations processes where only one of them has to be directly observable.
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tional expectations hypothesis is not testable. It can be only assumed.
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pectations (observable process) and the market expectations (unobservable
process).
The error term  t in expression (4) can be written for the market expec-
tations and survey expectations separately:
 t =  1( 
e
t,12 –  t+12) + rt +  t –  0 (5)
and
  t =  1(  e
t+12 –  t+12) + rrt +   t –  0 (6)
where  0 and  1 have the same interpretation as  0 and  1, respectively,
but as the surveyed expectations   e
t,12 are introduced a different denotation
is chosen. From here the idea of the test is straightforward.
The null hypothesis is
H0:    e
t,12 =  
e
t,12
where again   e
t,12 denotes the surveyed inflation expectations formed at
the beginning of period t for the time horizon till t + 12, and  
e
t,12 are the true
market expectations for the same period of time. We can see that under H0,
the error terms (5) and (6) must coincide, i.e.  0 =  0 and  1 =  1, and in-
cluding the unobservables, i.e., rt = rrt and  t =   t.
Substituting   t instead of  t in (4) and rearranging, one obtains
it = ( 0 –  0) + ( 1 –  1)  t,12 +  1  e
t,12 + rrt +   t (7)
For the testing purposes, we set  0 –  0 = ar,  1 –  1 = a,  1 = b to obtain
the final testing formula
it =a r + a t+12 +b   e
t,12 +u t (8)
Because the ex ante real interest rate and risk premium are unobservable,
they are put as the error term ut in (8), ut = rt +  t. If the above assump-
tions and following requirements hold, then one may conclude that
  e
t,12 =  
e
t,12. (i) if  0 =  0 and  1 =  1, then it must be that ar = a =0   and
(ii) b must be statistically significant and positive. From (i), we see that
testing H0 on (8), we perform a joint hypothesis test. Firstly, we test for
the equality of surveyed and market expectations. And secondly, we test for
the equality of ex ante real interest rates and risk premiums.
When performing the test, one ought to be aware of the three major weaknesses
the test suffers from. The first concerns the character of disturbances in (8).
The disturbances in (8) contain the variable part of ex ante real interest
rate. If the real interest rate is a function of productivity, it may be the case
that thedisturbance term follows anon-stationary process. In general, when
residuals contain a unit root, one ends up with a spurious regression. Gi-
ven this possibility, an essential part of the methodology is to test the dis-
turbances for stationarity. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and
the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test are employed. Indeed,
if a unit root is identified, the test cannot be used.3
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to have an autocorrelation structure. In this case the test can still be used,
one just has to correct for the autocorrelation effect on the parameters’stan-
dard error estimates. The parameters’ unbiasedness and consistency pro-
perty remain unaffected otherwise.
Further in equation (3a) it is stated that the nominal interest rate and ex-
pected inflation do not need to move in a one-to-one relation. Following
the analysis by Mishkin (1990b), this may arise if there is correlation between
expected inflation and ex ante real interest rate. Since, the real interest rate
is in the error term, OLS estimates are inconsistent and the instrumental
variable approach must be employed instead. This is the method used here.
The second problem one should be aware of is the problem of multi-
-collinearity. The occurrence of multi-collinearity is very likely, which fol-
lows from the nature of the formation of expectations. The closer the ex-
pectations are to the REH, the more severe the problem is, since both  t +1 2
and  e
t,12 are regressors.
The third concern is the problem of joint hypothesis. The problem is that
the methodology crucially relies on the assumption that the Fisher rule
holds. Thus if it happens the null hypothesis is rejected, one cannot be cer-
tain whether it is because the market expectations are truly different from
the surveyed ones or because the Fisher rule is an invalid assumption. In-
deed, this is common to all tests of this type.4 However, the problem is les-
sened here. As mentioned in the introductory section, the focus on the prob-
lem of inflation expectations is from amacroeconomic perspective, and there
the Fisher rule is a standard way to capture the interest rate behavior.
In summary, to test H0, we estimate (8) and test whether the parameters
ar,a , and b are statistically significant. If the parameters ar and a are in-
significant and the parameter b is significant then H0 cannot be rejected.
If H0 cannot be rejected, the surveyed inflation expectations are likely to
coincide with the market expectations. Accounting for the test weaknesses,
an essential part of the test has to be (i) the test of residuals stationarity
and the consequent adjustment of critical values, and (ii) a check of
the multi-collinearity magnitude.
3. The Data
The data set consists of the monthly data of the Czech Interbank money
market. The source of the data is the Czech National Bank and the Czech
Statistical Office. For the testing purposes three series of monthly data are
employed: (i) the monthly average of nominal one-year Interbank interest
rate (Prague InterBank Offer Rate, PRIBOR 1Y), (ii) year-to-year CPI in-
flation, and (iii) year-to-year expected change in the CPI. The expectations
have been collected at the beginning of each month. The details of the sur-
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real interest rate, the real GDP growth can be used. Following the same idea as with expected
inflation, the real GDP growth becomes one of the explanatory variables in (8), and the unan-
ticipated part of the GDP growth enters the error term. In a standard economic environment,
the unanticipated real growth ought to be stationary and so does the whole error term in (8).
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2005:05. The whole data set can be obtained upon a request from the au-
thor.
Before moving further, let us discuss the data timing which is crucial for
the test. Aperiod t denotes a month. PRIBOR 1Y is an average of daily rates
within the period t. CPI is a measure of the price level within a given pe-
riod t. The data to construct the CPI are typically collected in the second
week of each month. We can roughly think of it as of a monthly price level
average. Thedata itself is published in thebeginning of thefollowing month.
Thus when computing the actual inflation rate one must be careful about
the data timing. For our purposes, the year-to-year inflation rate at time
t + 12 is the relative change in CPI between period t – 1 and t +1 1. Because
the information set available to the agents at time t contains only the CPI
of t–  1 as thelatest information about theactual price level, i.e.,  t= CPIt–  1,
CPIt–   2,... , then when comparing   e
t,12 with actual inflation over this period,
( t +1 2as denoted in equation (8)), the actual inflation rate is computed as
 t +1 2=1–  ( CPIt +1 1/CPIt – 1).
4. The Results
First let us draw attention to the critical values of t-tests employed here.
In the results below, a very low value of Durbin-Watson statistics is found
which indicates either the presence of a unit root in the residuals or their
strong positive autocorrelation. To test for the former, the augmented
Dickey-Fuller and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin tests are used. Since
the results, summarized in Appendix B, do not suggest statistically signi-
ficant evidence for the presence of the unit root, we argue in favor of a strong
positive autocorrelation in the residuals. Because of the autocorrelation,
the parameters’ standard errors are biased downwards, and the pivotal
statistics of t-tests are biased upwards. By simulating new critical values,
the effect of autocorrelation on the test results is eliminated. The critical
values reported below are not the standard ones but those adjusted for
the autocorrelation effect. Details on the simulation are presented in Ap-
pendix A.
The next reason for simulating the t-test’s critical values, instead of us-
ing the Student’s distribution, is also the presence of multi-collinearity. Ap-
pendix C investigates this issue more closely. Because the variance infla-
tion factor (VIF), the measure of the magnitude of collinearity, is 1.52, and
a critical value is 10, it is concluded that multi-collinearity is not a signifi-
cant problem. Despite this however, the parameters’standard errors are af-
fected and simulating critical values partially accounts for it.
Finally, the estimation results of equation (8) are reported in Table 1 and
Table 2. The test is performed for two data samples. The first sample ranges
from May 1999 to March 2003.5 The second one ranges from May 1999 to
May 2004. Two different samples are considered because of the structural
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accounting for 1.17% increase in expected inflation, is explained by the ex-
pected growth of oil prices due to the beginning of the second war in Iraq,
and an expected tax reform. Having the two samples, we control for
the structural change effect on the results.
For the sample excluding the structural break (Table 1), the null hypo-
thesis that the market expectations are equal to the surveyed expectations
cannot be rejected at the standard level of significance. The parameters ar
and a are not significantly different from zero, while the parameter b is
found to be significantly different from zero. The goodness of fit is about
80 % (without accounting for autocorrelation in residuals) which suggests
the joint hypothesis problem is not binding.
Similar results are obtained for the complete data sample. Here, equa-
tion (8) is expanded for a dummy variable to control for the structural break.
In Table 2 we see again the parameters ar and a are not significantly dif-
ferent from zero, while theparameterbis significant and positive. Thedum-
my variable parameter ar,dummy is found significant. Its value of –1.67 can
be accounted to the change in the mean value of unanticipated inflation
E( t+m) which constitutes the constant term in (8) and which has shifted in
March 2003 by about 1.2 %. The negative value of ar,  dummy indicates, that
the impact of the tax reform and other exogenous shocks was not antici-
pated in the market expectations and thus not reflected in the market price
(or it was mitigated by other factors). Even though the requirements to 
accept the null hypothesis are not met here, because the constant terms of
unanticipated inflation differ, we can conclude at least the variable parts
of (surveyed and market) expectations are very similar. Parameters a and
b have similar values and character for both data samples considered. We
might conclude that the surveyed expectations are very close to the market
expectations also on the full length sample. The variable components of ex-
pectations are still close to each other and the variable components are
the ones most interesting for any analysis.
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ar 0.2094 0.4008 4.5052
a 0.1445 2.8471 4.3978 0.32 0.79 43
b 1.1406 7.7296 4.6014
TABLE 1 it =a r + a t+12 + b e
t,12 +  t, 1999:05–2003:03




ar –0.5230 –1.1005 4.5052
ar, dummy –1.6769 –6.8732 4.5052 0.62 0.84 58
a 0.0853 1.5851 4.3978
b 1.3599 10.1255 4.6014
TABLE 2 it =a r + a t+12 + b e
t,12 +  t, 1999:05–2004:05
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portant information for macroeconomists and that they are not only some
senseless numbers. They may be taken seriously when assessing future
macroeconomic developments. Of course, if the test results also hold in
the future.
Now abstracting from the macroeconomic view, the results seem some-
what surprising. The surveyed expectations are formed by financial ana-
lysts which do not have any direct connection to the market makers in 
order to influence their actions. In practice, it is more than likely that
the dealers do not pay any attention to the analysts’ inflation expectations,
or rather the dealers do not have any inflation expectations at all. Their
particular objective, as professionals, is to maximize their profit and their
actions mostly have speculative motives. Despite this, the financial ana-
lysts’ expectations get included in the market price formed by the market
makers. Here the surveyed expectations have such an explanatory power
on the market price that they can be viewed to be close to the market ex-
pectations character.
In the rest of the text let us offer a possible story how the financial fore-
casts’ may get transmitted in the market price. The story ought to be taken
as a motivation for further discussion and elaborations on this topic.
The character of the Czech Interbank money market and the credit mar-
ket can offer one possible explanation of the above observations. The credit
market is the main channel used to transmit the capital to the economy.
Banks (lenders) are the market price setters, and borrowers are price-
-takers. The price on the credit market is derived from the price on the In-
terbank money market which, in contrast to the credit market, may be con-
sidered a competitive one.
For banks as the major lenders of capital, it is profitable to bias their in-
flation forecasts (expectations) upwards. If we believe that bankers take
into account a nominal depreciation of money when forming the credit price,
overshooting these expectations increases their ex post real revenues. Gi-
ven that the borrowers are price-takers, overshooting is accepted. Let us
assume that a bank on the Czech credit market sets the one-year nominal
interest rate on credit so that it is composed of an individual PRIBOR 1Y
estimate plus a risk premium and a profit margin. The individual bank’s
PRIBOR 1Y estimate is composed of a required minimum ex ante real re-
turn plus an expected nominal depreciation (expected inflation). Having
a price on the credit market, the lenders face a possible lack or excess of
loanable funds (deposits from clients). To utilize them, they are motivated
to enter the Interbank market and trade them. Under the assumption that
the pricing rule is the same for all banks in the credit market, there will be
only a moderate correction in the market PRIBOR in order to make the mar-
ket clear. The new market PRIBOR is recursively reflected in the price on
the credit market.
In this story, the money-market dealers do not necessarily need to know
the inflation expectations the market price includes or even how the credit
price is formed. They are only “endowed” with an excess or deficit of money
which they trade. The deficits or excesses of loanable funds are determined
by the credit market, which is exogenous to the Interbank market.
354 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 7-8
s_344_362  5.8.2005  15:31  Stránka 3545. Conclusion
In this paper we find that surveyed inflation expectations, even though
they do not have a predictive power for actual inflation, they have a pre-
dictive power for the interest rate and that they do not statistically differ
from themarket expectations. This leads us to theconclusion that themeasu-
rements of financial market inflation expectations conducted by the Czech
National Bank yield macroeconomically relevant data and they can be taken
seriously when assessing future macroeconomic developments.
The analysis is conducted from the macroeconomic modeling perspective
and the choice of testing hypothesis and the data set serves this purpose.
The results question the macroeconomic modeling standards and analysis
of optimal monetary policy conduct in the Czech economy. They should mo-
tivate a discussion about modeling standards of private agents’expectations
in macroeconomic models. So far it is assumed private agents have perfect
knowledge and form the so called model based expectations (rational and
complete-knowledge expectations). The analysis indicates, however, this
does not need to be the case of the Czech economy. This may have conse-
quences for the optimal conduct of monetary policy. As Orphanides and
Williams (2003), and Evans and Honkapohja (2003) show, optimal mone-
tary policy differs for an economy where the agents have full knowledge
about the economic structure, and for an economy where agents face im-
perfect knowledge. What is found optimal in the rational and perfect know-
ledge world is not optimal in the imperfect knowledge world, and vice versa.
Macroeconomists and policy-makers ought to be aware of this fact.
Nonetheless, the research has produced more questions than answers.
The findings call for a study on why the Czech Interbank money market
anticipates inefficient expectations, and why there is no arbitrage incentive
to improve this. Given that the market has a unique position in the finan-
cial system, in general, it is not possible that the results found here would
hold in the long run. Hence, although we make some headway towards ex-
plaining how theinefficient inflation forecasts are transmitted into themar-
ket price, a serious attempt to find the final answer should still be made.
Having a better understanding of how the market functions, we are in a bet-
ter position to improve our economic models and to suggest optimal poli-
cies.
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In this appendix, the methodology for obtaining the critical values reported in
the text is outlined. The methodology relies on Monte Carlo experiments. Mishkin
(1990b) was the motivation for this approach.
The methodology can be summarized in the few following steps:
1. Analyze the time series of model variables, i.e., PRIBOR 1Y, year-to-year inflation,
and inflation expectations, on the unit root.
2.  Apply the Box-Jenkins methodology on the data. The outcome ought to be
an ARIMA(p,d,q) model with the best fit possible.
3. Simulate the estimated models from the previous step.
4. Using the simulated time series, estimate equation (8), and save the results on
the t-tests.
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 10,000 times.
6. From step 5 construct a new distribution for critical values.
The simulated critical values are reported in Table 3.
356 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 7-8
Parameter 25 % 10 % 5 % 1 %
ar 1.7339 3.6738 4.5052 7.2765
a 1.7232 3.4252 4.3978 6.8293
b 1.8041 3.4825 4.6014 6.8393
TABLE 3 The Simulated Critical Values
APPENDIX B
The regression residuals from (8) are tested for a unit root here. Testing for a unit
root is crucial for the regression results, because residuals are partially estimates of
real interest rate, and there might be an economic reason to believe that a unit root
is present. If it is so, then the results are spurious and non-usable.6 To test for the unit
root, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin
(KPSS) tests are employed. Each of them test for a unit root but from a different
view. The null hypothesis of the ADF test is that a time series is not stationary while
the null hypothesis of the KPSS test is that a time series is stationary. Applying both
tests provides a more complex picture than using only one of them.
The results for the ADF test are summarized in Table 4. Following Enders (1995),
the ADF test is based on testing H0:   =0  i n
p
   ^
t =    ^
t–1 +   i   ^
t–i+1 +  t
i=2
where   ^
t are the residuals from estimating (8).
Parameter Estimate t-test t-crit. F-test Q-test
(p-value) (crit.val.)
  –0.2192 –7.5765 –1.95
 1 –0.0115 –0.1414 –1.69 5.65 17.28
(0.02) (25.70)
 2 –0.1728 –2.3414 –1.69
TABLE 4 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results
6 For details on spurious regression, refer to Granger and Newbold (1978) who experimentally
demonstrated the consequences of unit root on regression results, and to Phillips (1986) who
formalized their results.
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potheses of residuals being non-stationary is rejected (    0).
The KPSS test results are summarized in Table 5. The test statistics are com-
puted for the lag truncation parameter,  , from 0 to 8. As argued by Kwiatkowski et
al. (1992), for   =8   the test has the largest power. Including   = 0, the test also ac-
counts for autocorrelation. The critical value for the test at the 5% significance level
is 0.463.
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  I 012 345 6 78
  ^
t 1.10 0.62 0.47 0.38 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.24
TABLE 5 KPSS Test Results
The results from the KPSS test suggest that the regression residuals from esti-
mating (8) are stationary. For   =2   the test result is on the margin of statistical sig-
nificance. Putting the result together with the ADF test, it may be concluded that
the residuals do not contain a unit root and follow a stationary process. Consequently,
the parameter estimates reported above are unbiased and consistent, although inef-
ficient.
APPENDIX C
In this section the collinearity issue is addressed. First, a formal test for the pre-
sence of collinearity is performed. At the same time the test is also a test of the ra-
tional expectations hypothesis. Second, the effect of collinearity on parameters’ esti-
mates and their standard errors is quantitatively analyzed.
The Test of Collinearity
The test is standard to the econometric literature. It is based on a variance infla-
tion factor estimation. Because it tests for the linear relationship between  t+12 and
 e
t,12, the test is at the same time a test of the REH.
The REH is usually tested on the following inflation-prediction equation – see e.g.
(Bakhshi – Yates, 1998):
 t+12 = c1 + c2 e
t+12 +  t+12
If the REH holds, parameter c1 is zero, c2 is equal to 1, and  t+12 is an iid process with
zero mean and finite variance. In this case the two variables  t+12 and  e
t+12 are evi-
dently collinear.
When the inflation-prediction equation is estimated, R
–2 is used to evaluate
collinearity. To this purpose a variance inflation factor (VIF) is computed:
1 VIF = –––––
1– R
–2
Usually, we face a problem of collinearity if VIF > 10.
The estimation results of the inflation-prediction equation are summarized in
Table 6.
First, we can see that c1   0, c2   1, and the residuals are positively auto-corre-
lated. As a consequence, the REH cannot be accepted. Second, the VIF is 1.5 which
is far from the value where collinearity causes estimation problems.
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  of equation (8):
it =a r + a t+12 + b e
t,12 +  t
To find the estimates of the parameters, the ordinary least-square criteria is used:
N
  (it –a r – a t+12 – b e
t,12)2 → min
t=1
Minimizing the criterion gives rise to the set of normal equations:
0 =   2(it –a r – a t+12 – b e
t,12)(–1)
0 =   2(it –a r – a t+12 – b e
t,12)(– t+12)
0 =   2(it –a r – a t+12 – b e
t,12)(– e
t,12) 
which can be conveniently rewritten as
0 = i -–a
^  –– b
^
  –e
0 = cov(it,  t+12) – a
^var( t+12) – b
^
cov( t+12,  e
t,12)
0 = cov(it,  e
t+12) – a





1 where x – = ––  
N
t=1 xt. Or in a matrix form:
N
a
^ var( t+12) cov( t+12,  e
t,12) cov(it,  t+12)        =    b
^
cov( e
t,12, t+12) var( e
t,12) cov(it,  e
t,12)
var( t+12) cov( t+12,  e
t,12) where      is the information matrix X’X. cov( e
t,12, t+12) var( e
t,12)
Solving for the parameter estimates gives
1 cov(it,  e
t,12)   cov(it,  t+12) b
^
= ––––– ––––––––––– – –––––  –––––––––––––––– 1 –  2 var( e
t,12)1  –    std( t+12)std( e
t,12)
cov(it,  t+12) std( e
t,12) a
^ = ––––––––––– – b
^
 ––––––––– var( t+12)  t+12
a
^
r = i -–a
^  –– b
^
  –e
cov( t+12,  e
t,12) where  = –––––––––––––––7
std( t+12)std( e
t,12)
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Note: The critical values are simulated similarly as in Appendix A.
TABLE 6  t+12 =c 1 + c2 e
t,12 +  t+12
Parameter Estimate t-stat. Critical
value 5 % DW R
–2 No.of obs.
c1 –4.3353 –2.9835 2.5160 0.16 0.34 44 c2 1.7051 4.8067 2.6748
7 Note that   = 0 gives rise to a standard OLS estimate.
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fect on parameters’ standard errors. For simplicity, let us assume that regression
residuals are homoscedastic and uncorrelated. Then the parameters’variance can be
expressed as:
a
^ var( t+12) cov( t+12,  e
t,12)
–1




t,12, t+12) var( e
t,12)
var( t+12)   std( t+12)std( e
t,12)
–1
=  2         =
  std( e
t,12)std( t+12) var( e
t,12)
 2 var( t+12)   std( t+12)std( e
t,12) = ––––––––––––––––––––––    (1 –  2) var( t+12)var( e
t,12)   std( e




r) =   – 2 var(a
^) +   – e2 var(b
^
).
The analysis is limited for the above case only. Because the autocorrelation is ac-
counted for in the critical values, this limitation is suitable for further purposes.
To quantitatively analyze the influence of collinearity on the parameters’estimates
and t-tests, their values are simulated for different magnitudes of correlation ( ) be-
tween  t+12 and  e
t,12. The analysis is conducted on the set of descriptive statistics
summarized in Table 7.
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TABLE 7 The Calibrated Values – Actual Data Statistics
Statistics Estimate
  0.5957
cov(it,  t +12) 1.6795
cov(it,  e
t,12) 0.7405
std( t +12) 2.0575
std( e
t,12) 0.7188




  – 2.5432
  –e 4.0341
From the graphical results (Figures 5–7) follows that only the parameter a is sen-
sitive to the value of  . Its estimate differs considerably for   =0  and   =6  and so do
the t-statistics. However, what is important here is that the parameter is not statis-
tically significant for   = (0.5, 0.9). By the nature of expectations, the correlation be-
tween  e
t,12 and  t+12 should not be very low, even though the REH does not hold.
Parameter ar is always statistically insignificant and b is statistically significant
under the simulation setup. Hence, it might be concluded the results presented in
the paper are robust for   = (0.5, 0.9).
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FIGURE 5 Dependence of  
^ ar and its t-statistics on  
FIGURE 6 Dependence of  
^ a and its t-statistics on  
FIGURE 7 Dependence of  
^
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Do the Measurements of Financial Market Inflation
Expectations Yield Relevant Macroeconomic
Information?
Martin FUKAČ – Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University and
Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (CERGE-EI),
Prague (martin.fukac@cerge-ei.cz)
Monthly data concerning the inflation expectations of financial analysts in
the Czech Republic exhibit a tendency for bias and ineffectiveness. This paper ana-
lyses, from a macroeconomic perspective, whether the surveyed data include any
relevant macroeconomic information, specifically, whether the surveyed expecta-
tions correspond to market expectations considered in macroeconomic analysis and
models. Using a methodology based on a simple Fisher rule, it is found that the dif-
ference between the surveyed and market inflation expectations is not statistically
significant. From this perspective, it is concluded the surveyed inflation expecta-
tions bear economically relevant information.
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